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F 
J L R O M T H E R U S S I A N Formalists to Roland Barthes and beyond, 
literary critícism has learnt to treat Realism as an historical and 
conceptual phenomenon over and above the dogmatic insis-
tence on its unmediated relationship with the real world. A n 
ironic consequence of this exposure of Realism's conventionality 
is the separation o f Realism as an epistemological assumption 
from Realism as a self-conscious ethic. A modern writer may 
choose to adopt the techniques of Realism because of his or her 
commitment to a certain relationship between literature and 
social praxis, rather than out of naive faith in the ability of 
narrative to represent the world. Yet can this ethic survive its 
necessary combat with the relativism of modernity without re-
course to an authoritarian assertion o f its superior relation to 
"real i ty," and thus enter into exchange with modernist values 
and techniques? O r is Realism unable to break with its past, left to 
offer only a more and more dogmatic, even a more and more 
visceral, repudiation of modernity? The aim of this essay is to 
pursue a distinction made by Roman Jakobson, in one of the 
earliest reconsiderations of Realism, through a contemporary 
novel that not only lays claim to Realism as a literary technique, 
but recommends it as an ethic: C . J . Koch's The Doubleman. My 
intention here is not to provide a definitive answer to the ques-
tions out l ined above so much as to clarify the terms of the debate 
as pursued by an Australian novelist of considerable reputation. 
The loud challenge to debate made by Koch's novel should not 
be ignored, if contemporary fiction is not to ease into a comfort-
able and innocuous consensus, wherein putatively postmodern 
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techniques become commonplace, with only a superficial recall 
of the difficult and radical controversies that gave rise to them. 
In his 1921 article " O n Realism In A r t , " Jakobson traces the 
way the " r e a l " renews its authority as a term of literary judge-
ment. A new generation of realists foregrounds what had previ-
ously been c ons i d e r ed "unnecessa r y d e t a i l s , " b r e a k i n g 
convention by violating inherited emphases and perspectives. 
The reader experiences this rupture of convention as imme-
diacy, where the platitudes that had made his or her relationship 
with the world stale and habitual are erased, and access to the 
real seems direct. The implication of this argument is that our 
experience of the real is primarily an experience of strangeness, 
rather than authenticity or correspondence between a represen-
tation and what it purports to represent. 
"Strangeness" itself can, o f course, be seen as a corollary o f the 
category "real i ty," with its implications of consensus about the 
distinction between the normal and the marginal. Perhaps from 
Diderot onwards, but certainly from Balzac and Dickens, Real-
ism as a literary form has depended on evoking or more accu-
rately def ining the strange as the object o f its fascination and the 
source of both its rationale and the terminology for its judge-
ments. Whether it takes the form of the degenerate, the de-
formed, or the perverse—al l terms that can only be made 
meaningful under the aegis of a strictly located normal i ty— 
strangeness has always been the necessary assumption of Real-
ism, its Siamese twin at which it looks with distaste but from which 
it cannot separate itself. The aim of this article is to show that the 
distinction between the strange and the real is not one defined 
by strict and objective rational categories. The experience o f the 
" r e a l " in bourgeois culture is inalienable from a strong sense of 
the pressing threat of the strange, a strange which both repels 
and tempts, challenges prejudices and confirms them. In the 
end, the encounter with these two apparently binary opposites 
becomes more or less a single experience, and the separation 
between them can only be loudly proclaimed by an appeal to 
author i ty—in literary terms, the authority of narrative truth — 
rather than by dispassionate demonstration. 
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In The Doubleman, an evil power is imputed to the otherworld 
of Faery, which Koch associates with a variety of ideas and ideo-
logies from gnosticism to astrology and hedonism. The novel 
traces the experience of Richard Mi l ler from his chi ldhood 
fascination with this otherworld, through his ambivalent rela-
tionships with several o f its more enthusiastic proponents, and 
ends with his effective cure, his eventual l iberation from delusion 
in the novel's dying words. We assume that this cure signifies his 
achievement of the unde luded detachment which allows h im to 
become the authoritadve narrator who judges the other charac-
ters and his own past with such certainty. It is from an ostensible 
narrative present that Mi l ler 's criticism of his own past is spoken. 
His past is made coherent by retrospection, creating for the 
protagonist a double se l fhood—a benighted and wandering 
character is transformed to a perc ip ient and authoritative 
narrator. 
Yet, there remains something uncertain about this contrast. 
The distinction between Faery and the narrative authority that 
stands opposite it is asserted rather than clearly demonstrated. In 
the end, an accidental death is contrived to damn conclusively 
the narcotic otherworld. This almost arbitrary conclusion is em-
blematic o f the book's inability to articulate the distinction on 
which it seems to depend—the contrast between pagan delusion 
and the realism that underlies Mi l ler 's retrospection. The as-
sumpt ions on wh ich this d i s t inc t i on is based are never 
investigated—there is no recognition that narrative's claim to 
deal with truth by way of fiction might be problematic, and might 
even involve the same sort of manipulation and appeal to author-
ity as the occult. 
The constant danger of narrative and the occult becoming 
indistinguishable presses on the reader in the text. The Double-
man embraces a patterning of omen, fascination, and dream that 
harnesses the mystery and energy of what Koch calls Faery while 
apparently trying to repudiate it. Realism's dependence on the 
strange for its charisma is played out here in narrative's depen-
dence on the occult. That which is ostensibly to be condemned is 
embraced. That which the text seems to be dividing off from the 
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world because it is dangerous proves to be necessary to the text's 
very existence, even an analogue o f its substance. 
In Koch's world of Faery, separateness and difference take on 
an almost archetypal menacing power. This is first made clear in 
the characterization of Clive Broderick, the swarthy Man in the 
Lane (13), whom the adolescent Mi l l e r first meets on the way to 
school. " H e was no ordinary man going to work at a l l , " Mi l l e r 
recalls; " h e was not like other peop le " (13). Later, when the two 
characters meet outside Sandy Lovejoy's shop, Broderick is de-
scribed in exacdy the same terms: " I still found [his eyes] differ-
ent from other eyes" (53). This obscurity does not lead to 
curiosity, but to fear, and the imputatíon to Broderick of other-
worldly power. " T h e man made me uneasy to a degree for which 
there seemed no explanat ion" (13); " i t was very important to 
contradict h i m " (14). Koch teases us with such statements, un-
wil l ing to supply us with more than impl ied meanings. Mi l ler 's 
experience o f Broderick is l imited to "enigmatic flashes, tel l ing 
me litde, yet intriguing me more and m o r e " (62). 
This undefined power is related to esoteric knowledge. Bro-
derick's knowledge takes many fo rms—from a mastery o f all 
aspects of guitar-playing to obscure but certain business ski l l , 
from his confident denunciation o f the Cathol ic Church to his 
encyclopaedic acquaintance with different spiritual traditions. 
His office "seems more suggestive of esoteric knowledge than 
any lecturer's study" (123). Broderick's function as a character is 
c lear—to effect at least a notional connection between esoteric 
knowledge and a menacing obscure power. He provides the 
experiments o f his younger protégés with a connection to the 
world history o f dangerous superstition without which they could 
appear merely odd. It is through h im that Faery is established as a 
real force to be reckoned with, possessed o f as long and impor-
tant a tradition as the Christianity to which it stands opposite. 
It is Darcy Burr who inherits the l ink between knowledge and 
danger that started with Broderick. The two men even look alike 
(274-75). 1° the book's closing scene, Mi l ler mistakes one for the 
other (35t). From the outset, Darcy is presented as evil and 
manipulative. " H i s face shows a pitiless coldness" (109). Mi l ler is 
not surprised to learn that he has been involved with the Church 
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of Scientology, and imprisoned (227). He offers Mi l ler a share in 
his power over the others: "We can make it happen, you and 
me, " he says. " T h e others' l l be our instruments" (248). L ike 
Broderick's before h im, Burr 's power takes on an abstract d imen-
sion: " i t was a form of power, and on that scale . . . it ceased to be 
vulgar and became a sort of mystery" (288). 
Mil ler too has been tempted by the connection between sep-
arateness, knowledge, and power. Koch traces his disposition to 
illusion back to his chi ldhood, when, in convalescing from pol io, 
he was obsessed with a private toy theatre. This toy theatre allows 
h im to develop his fantasies, and indulge his dreams o f manipu-
lation. It is combined with his amateur researches into Faery into 
" a rite of worsh ip" (30). It is clear from the start that this taste for 
i l lusion is dangerous. His grandfather soon regrets that he has 
bought the toy (24)- The young Mi l ler knew that this regret was 
not misplaced (29), and that his yearning to go to Elf-land was 
"sickly, f oo l i sh" (31). Later, his involvement with A B S as a radio 
and television producer is seen as a version of the same dan-
gerous theatre of i l lusion. The mass media are presented as 
other, modern versions o f Faery; its actors work in "fantasy" 
(144). Several times he even says he is "work ing in my toy theatre 
aga in" (260). The world o f Faery theatre il lusion in ch i ldhood 
and media i l lusion in adulthood are defined in the same terms, 
contriving for Mil ler 's career and character at least a symbolic 
consistency. His knowledge o f Faery, on which he discourses 
eloquently to both Burr and the reader, is part of the same 
apparent entrapment, by which he is reluctantly caught up in the 
larger struggle which is the abstract background to the novel's 
narrative. 
Together, Mi l ler and Burr are separate from the social norm, 
possessed of a knowledge and power that allow them to manipu-
late others: 
We laughed like conspirators, as though there were an underlying 
point to the presentation, never put into words by either of us, which 
went beyond mere entertainment, and would catch people unawares, 
subtly undermining their simple enjoyment of a folk group, and 
drawing them into that Otherworld they thought had no power 
anymore, its messages carried by the weird electric whine of the 
guitars. (260) 
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Such self-indulgent play with esoteric knowledge, when com-
bined with a willingness to manipulate, ends in dangerous expo-
sure of innocents to the otherworld. In an unabashed generality, 
Koch announces how naive enjoyment can be undermined by 
cynical manipulators, exposing the unprepared to an archaic, 
putatively satanic, power. Faery is indeed dangerous—the novel 
connects it with the media, Nazis and Communists (237), Scien-
tology and crime (227), gnosticism (127), the occult (112), hedo-
nism and the love o f Nature (310), drug use (262), and interest in 
foreign cultures (275). 
What stands against Faery? In several important episodes in 
the book, an alternative spirituality l inked to Cathol icism is 
proposed. This first happens when the adolescent Mi l l e r meets a 
charismatic Italian monk who warns h i m against the delights of 
sensuality (47-48). He is described in these terms: 
Every one of us received his smile, like a gift to take away for the rest of 
the day; I was to take it away for the rest of my life. (45) 
This image o f spiritual purity conveyed by a beatific smile is 
repeated in one o f the book's final episodes, when the disori-
ented Mi l ler enters a Catholic church in Darlinghurst. His dis-
taste for an elderly communicant is overcome when he sees h im 
returning from the altar-rail (339). In an interview with Michael 
Hülse, Koch has described this scene as one in which Mi l l e r 
recognizes "psychic hea l th " in the Mass. In these two episodes, a 
clear preference emerges for the simple rites o f Catholicism, 
which are seen to offer some protection from "wicked spirits who 
wander through the world to the ru in of souls" (339). Yet this 
alternative is never fully argued. Separate episodes do not quite 
cohere to become a thoroughly articulated Cathol ic position. 
The alternative Koch proposes most consistendy and emphat-
ically to the blindness of Faery is not xvithin the narrative. It is the 
narrative itself and its persona, the simultaneously credulous and 
skeptical Mil ler. There is something paradoxical about the deni-
gration o f i l lusion in television, radio, and popular music within 
the confines of a work of fiction. There is no serious attempt to 
argue a way out of this paradox, by, for example, recourse to 
documentation as authority for the period the novel covers, or a 
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model o f culture that separates fictions into deluded low and 
perceptive high forms. The problem is not acknowledged. The 
most striking manifestation of this paradox is the similarity be-
tween the detachment, knowledge, and power provided by Faery, 
and that provided for Mi l l e r when he becomes the narrator. 
The detachment Mi l l e r enjoys as narrator locates h im in a 
present separate f rom the novel's main action. The novel's 
closing words signal the transformation in his life that allows h im 
this detachment. The occult name Eurybia loses its power over 
h im: 
The cold name shone briefly from the bottom of memory: a forgot-
ten toy; something from my boyhood at Trent Street, with no more 
glamour. 
And I knew now that it was all gone—like Harrigan Street and 
Broderick, and the district of Second-hand. (352) 
The breaking of this spell gives the book its end. Within the plot's 
projected naturalistic time, it frees the narrator so that he can 
dispassionately scrutinize and assess the lives of those around 
h im. Koch reminds us several times that Mi l ler is recall ing the 
story from a very different present. O f the nightmares that close 
contact with Darcy Burr had inspired in h im, he writes: " l i tde o f 
their content comes back now. . . . Even now, I puzzle over the 
strength of conviction I developed that these weren't normal 
dreams" (317; emphasis added). This implication that Mi l l e r is 
writing from a particular present time, in which he is no longer 
subject to the pu l l o f the otherworld, sets h im apart from the 
other characters in the novel. 
Given that the detachment of those enthralled by Faery leads 
to esoteric knowledge and power over others, it is important to 
note that Mi l l e r as narrator combines a similar sort o f knowledge 
with a similar sort o f power. This knowledge takes the form of an 
almost encyclopaedic general knowledge; his power over other 
characters is demonstrated in his judgement of them. Mil ler 's 
amazing general knowledge is not part o f his characterization as 
much as emblematic of his authority as a narrator. The reader is 
casually informed that the buleria is " the most virile of flamenco 
forms" (103). There are almost textbook accounts o f the history 
of Tasmania and Estonia, the sensual life of Sydney, and the 
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history of Faery archetypes. A description of Sydney harbour 
even announces that it covers exactly twenty-one square miles 
(185). Susan McKeman has remarked that Koch evinces a tour-
ist's oudook. This may seem a gl ib way to describe this k ind o f 
writing, but it is important to notice how literally Koch under-
stands the idea o f narratorial omniscience. 
This knowledge is also exhibited in the narrator's irrepressible 
determinadon to pronounce universal truths, usually i n the form 
of aphorisms: 
The artist, the amateur of the arts and the convalescent all pass 
through the same door. Those, that is, who have been truly broken — 
but who have afterwards been able to mend. (24) 
[M]ystery is the property of very simple and self-contained people, 
and is often an illusion. (40) 
All enthrallment is an arrested past: the prolonged, perverse child-
hood from which some souls never escape. (63) 
Throughout the narrative, the narrator is possessed of unrivalled 
knowledge about both trivial details and universal truths. 
The most important manifestation of this knowledge is the 
insight Mi l ler has into the lives of other characters. He orders 
their lives, putting them " inside the f rame" (270), overseeing 
them in the same way that he and Burr were able to use their 
knowledge to manipulate the Rymers. The judgement Mi l ler 
pronounces on the characters often takes a form as simple as the 
aphorisms mentioned above. He says of Darcy Burr that he "was 
only half-educated, and therefore an easy mark for odd ideas" 
(117); or of Katrin Vi lde that "she was a mixture in equal parts of 
sensuality and old-style propriety, a mixture more common then 
than it is now" (196). He dismisses characters by reducing them 
to a simple formula; he says of Rita Carey: "I suspected she was 
the sort of person who found it difficult to keep her life tidy. 
Reality was di f f icult" (252-53). 
The most significant example of this sort of anthropology is 
the treatment of Deirdre Di l lon , who is understood almost com-
pletely in terms of cliché. Deirdre is "Dadda 's g i r l " (94). The 
narrator becomes moralistic when she is raped, blaming her: 
She has no understanding of why this penalty has come to her: even 
now, she doesn't see that her mirror-games have gone too far. It isn't 
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her fault, it's Burr's fault; Patrick's fault. She'll run away crying, to tell 
Dadda. (325) 
This sort of judgement cannot merely be explained away as part 
of Mil ler 's characterization or even the arrogance of an unrel i-
able narrator. Mi l ler as narrator displays the same k ind of detach-
ment, knowledge, and authority exercised by Broderick, Burr, 
and himself while empowered by the spirit o f the otherworldly. 
Narrative is a kind of white magic for Koch, contesting the 
illusions and thraldom of Faery with the authority of its truth. No 
alternative system of belief ever appears in the novel in the same 
detail or on the same scale as Faery. Catholicism and Andres 
Vilde's pronouncements on history may be notionally connected 
with Mi l ler 's clear-sighted realism. But the only thing o f suffi-
cient scope and coherence to deal with the otherworld is the 
retrospective judgement o f a detached narrator. This is why Koch 
so meticulously foregrounds the conditions under which the 
narrative has been made possible. Here we do not merely find 
h im surrendering to convention. In the dispassionate and omnis-
cient narrator, we are invited to detect the machinery of truth. So 
confident are we supposed to be in the authority of narrative that 
Mil ler 's opinions need not be incorporated into a general or 
coherent argument. 
K o c h tries to compensate for this lack o f argument by 
persistent assertion. In this way, the judgemental narrator is 
emblematic of Koch's aesthetic, which prefers pronouncement 
to elaboration, assertion to discussion, and aphorism to dis-
course. Sometimes the distinction between Faery and its oppo-
site is argued by the mere insertion o f an adjective or recall o f a 
platitude. Things are associated with the irrational or other-
worldly by the force of a single word, often when the association 
is not readily apparent. Brady plays the guitar as if looking at " a 
v i s ion" (60). The guitar is a "mag i ca l " instrument (64). Bun-
brings " the irrational through the door with h i m " (213). Mari-
juana is described merely as "dangerous" (217). Darcy's ambi-
tion to be famous is described as "myst i ca l " (301). Koch enforces 
the identity between the i l lusion of Faery and the fantasy world of 
the mass media by analogy alone. He describes mass enthusiasm 
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for the media as a chi ld 's search for "fairy f o od " (145). Those 
who work in the media are "mechanics o f dreams" (229). Given 
the historical emphasis Koch places on the meaning o f Faery, 
these analogies function as more than mere imaginative decora-
tion. The analogy, unsubstantiated and undeveloped, claims the 
status o f truth. This slippage from analogy to statement is more 
than mere ineptitude, however. By adding an adjective or image, 
Koch is trying to convince us that Broderick's Faery and Mil ler 's 
Realism are really very different. This seems to acknowledge 
almost tacitly that the two world-views are constantly i n danger of 
collapsing into one another. 
The same problem arises with the book's ending. There is an 
attempt here to make an emphatic statement about the dangers 
of Faery through the accidental death o f Deirdre D i l l on . The 
statement that the rocks on which she fell " h a d always been 
wait ing" (351) seems to claim, not only that there was a certain 
inevitability about her death, but that this inevitability has been 
c lear ly and subtly demons t ra ted by her character i za t ion 
throughout. We find, however, that Dierdre's characterization 
has merely been one undramatized assertion after another. 
When she and Mi l l e r first meet i n Tasmania, she is described as a 
two-faced personality, " a n indulged, precocious ch i ld . . . and a 
mature, cultivated w o m a n " (81). When he meets her again to-
wards the book's end, he finds her " a n infant forever" (284), 
indulging her whims in dangerous games. This sort o f character-
ization proceeds by labell ing rather than by demonstration. De-
irdre's death is the definitive episode that coincides with Mil ler 's 
final freedom from the entrapment of Faery, the freedom that 
allows h im to become the novel's narrator. Yet, as the culmina-
tion, not of demonstrated necessity, but o f dogmatic enthusiasm, 
this death is a mere assertion of danger superadded to the plot as 
a symbolic repetition of statements already insisted upon , rather 
than the result o f their patient development into an argument. 
By asserting rather than arguing the difference between Real-
ism and the otherworldly, whether that assertion takes the form 
of an extra adjective or an arbitrarily added violent episode, the 
novel chooses to rest on authority alone. Because that authority is 
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the authority o f Realist narrative, the genre whose conventions 
are most easily mistaken for uncondit ioned perception, a con-
sensus of common sense readership is evoked: we do not need to 
have things spelt out for us, because we can fall back on funda-
mental agreement about, for example, what is deluded and what 
is real perception, or what is normal and what is abnormal. 
Assertion is relied upon because we as readers are not being 
informed about danger as much as being reminded of it. This 
pre-knowledge is what places us in the community of Realism. 
Narrative authority stands as the sign o f this putatively obvious 
community, and assertion is its weapon. Its confidence seems to 
imply that consensus is so close that the text itself is actually in 
the process of freeing us from the strange in such a way that we 
will soon be able to experience the real alone. 
Yet, in The Doubleman, the real depends upon the strange for its 
power and distinctiveness, and can never deliver what it seems to 
promise, a spiritual world where the strange will fall away, leaving 
us with the real, sanitary and glorious. This is made most explicit 
when we see how the novel relies on the mysterious and al luring 
for its effect. Koch repeatedly emphasizes the ominous, begin-
ning with portentous descriptions o f Tasmania. St Augustine's 
steeple is " a watch-tower over a camp of fear" (i i) ; " i t seemed to 
me that the fusty odour of fear, the stench of the prison-ships was 
still in Hobar t " (34). Mi l l e r constandy evokes an undefined 
threat. A lane hums "wi th unnatural warn ing" (16). His holiday 
at Greystones is " the dangerous time, when the extraordinary 
might happen " (91). Talking to Darcy Burr, he feels " a n actual 
sense of threat" (127). While walking on his balcony in Elizabeth 
Bay, he feels " a sense o f secret events gathering; a feeling of 
being watched" (151). When he first sees Burr and Brady at the 
Grain Loft, he has " n o premonit ion at all . . . o f what might 
happen " (217). 
Not only does the narrative depend on this portentousness for 
much of its effect; it also harnesses the sense of scandal that 
surrounds dubious or controversial behaviour. A séance is de-
scribed in graphic detail, and the character o f Denise is contrived 
to add to i t asor to f cheapened sexuality (112-16). Denise is always 
described in a nightgown: 
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Skinny as a boy except for the hinted swellings of her breasts, she
hitched with her free hand at the strap of her nightdress ... And there
was something abnonnal about her, I decided. (I (3)
Later, when she has been abandoned by Darcy and Brian's flight
to Melbourne, Miller meets her:
She continued to smile at me, and arched herself provocatively, her
small, sad paps showing through the nightdress like bruises. (135)
This association between the occult and pubescent sexuality is
not related to the narrative at all. It is contrived to add a morbid
erotic fascination to the already morally ambiguous.
There is a similar mysticism of landscape. Tasmania is de-
scribed in terms of "fields of unknown force ... a power and
mystery that could plainly be sensed; that could almost be heard
humming, like electricity" (138). This is more than just Miller's
fascination with the mysticism of landscape, something he has
been warned against (47-48). The treatment of Tasmania is part
of a fascination with the menacing and mysterious, whose cha-
risma remains relatively undiminished in the novel's imaginative
design and effect.
The novel thus relies for its interest on the scandal and mystery
it is claiming to repudiate. The fascination with the otherworldly,
in all its forms, and the need for the truth constantly evoke one
another. Yet the structure that expresses them, the fierce combat
between the occult's intent to deceive and the narrative's deter-
mination to enlighten, cannot keep them apart. They are con-
stantly in danger of becoming indistinguishable. One step
behind this problem lies the generic problem, that the real and
the strange not only depend upon one another for their dis-
tinctiveness, but are in fact part of one and the same act of
perception. It is impossible for the real to be imagined without
the strange. This explains why the strange must be evoked as a
threat. The strange is constantly threatening to consume the
real, to corrupt the normal and make it perverse. It is only by the
simple assertion of an unquestioning authority that these two
categories can be kept apart. Herein lies the fascination with The
Doubleman-the contest between these two imagined opposites is
played out, and finally a victor is proclaimed almost arbitrarily, by
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the recall of a consensus that is more or less a prejudice. The two 
can only be kept apart by force. 
Koch has written in his essay on the state of the novel ( "Who 
Wants the Novel?" ) a statement remarkably reminiscent o f 
Lukacs: 
When the rocks of reality and consistent personality are lost alto-
gether, then why should we care, and why should we believe? (10) 
Does this mean that character and reality are given facts, from 
which belief can be derived as logically necessary—we cannot do 
other than believe because reality and consistent personality are 
indisputable? O r is Koch saying belief is absolutely necessary, 
even primal; therefore, because belief depends on reality and 
consistent personality, we must commit ourselves to them too in 
order not to destabilize belief? O f course, Koch is saying both o f 
these things, and neither of them. The logic o f this statement is 
purely performative—it is a rhetorical question, supposedly con-
taining such force within it that conviction will be immediate. 
Belief, personality, and reality all depend upon one another. But 
they are in no way grounded, except in the momentary force of 
the performative—a performative that disguises an imperative 
in the language of consensus. Koch is unable to supply any 
logical reason other than a plea to our undefined better nature. 
We should believe. We should recognize the difference between 
Realism and Faery. Consensus is understood, not as the result of 
a patiently developed argument which convinces us to share 
certain values, but as the recall o f what an authoritative voice tells 
us we have believed all along and were only pretending not to 
believe. 
In the end, this sort of Realism is fundamentally about author-
ity. In his article, "L'effet du réel," Roland Barthes has argued 
that, in writers like Flaubert, nineteenth-century Realism chose 
to break out of the logic of pure social representation. This was 
done by incorporating into the narrative images and usages that 
were not simply reducible to a description of a specific element 
o f a consistently represented real world. This almost random 
inclusion of what Barthes calls, following Jakobson, "unneces-
sary detai ls" aimed to show that Realism was a system of repre-
60 N I C H O I A S M A N S F I E L D 
sentation that went beyond the mere repetition of pre-digested 
social meanings to represent the unassimilated real itself. In this 
way, Realism signified its direct access to the real, or, to put it 
more incisively, Realism signified itself. Realism proclaimed its 
own authority by presenting itself as smashing authority and 
giving the reader direct access to the real. Veronica Brady writes 
in her review of TheDoubleman that Koch's targets are the masters 
and manipulators o f the imagination. Yet this awareness of ma-
nipulators never becomes self-reflexive, choosing to ignore as 
unnecessary the main preoccupation of postmodern fiction, the 
self-consciousness that, from Beckett to Eco, from Robbe-Gril let 
to Janette Turner Hospital , has chosen to base its uncertainty 
about ideological authority in general on skepticism about its 
own claim to authority. 
One of the primary tasks of Realism, therefore, is to proclaim 
itself. This seems to be the aim of TheDoubleman—preferred and 
rejected ideologies are only kept apart by the assertion of narra-
tive authority, to which all the rest o f the novel's interests are 
secondary. Surprisingly, therefore, it is the novel's formal and 
aesthetic, rather than its moral and social, values that house, and 
determine, its polit ical commitments. This explains why widely 
disparate forms of social behav iour—from drug use to interest 
in Aborig inal cu l tu r e—can be equated so easily, and why the 
apparent alternative to them, Catholic moral realism, is only 
really distinguished from them by assertion. Questions of social 
behaviour fade in the face of the insistence on the assertion of an 
authority that proclaims itself free of the blindness and self-
indulgence of contemporary spiritual life. Yet, although it ap-
peals to our imagined better nature, and what we should admit 
we really do know, and although it disguises itself by repeated 
judgements about ideas and values it does not really care to know 
anything about, this authority is really only interested in itself. Its 
claim to repudiate specific deluded patterns of belief is secon-
dary to the assertion of authority. Its politics are based in dis-
course, a iming to question the diversity o f discussion and 
experiment it characterizes as modern life, by celebrating the 
habit of authority which that diversity interrogates. 
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